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Abstract: The paper gives an insight in how to deal with system complexity from a HAZOP study 
perspective. The research enlightens the importance of understanding system complexity in oil and gas 
industry and thereby gradually to change old-fashioned HAZOP industrial practice and improve safety 
performance in oil and gas industry. Methods and computer aided tools mentioned in the paper can 
improve HAZOP quality and efficiency with low manpower cost and support brainstorm section in 
HAZOP studies. The oil and gas industry can implement the method for HAZOP study on real plants to 
test its usefulness. 
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
1. INTRODUCTION 
Development of systematic methods and techniques for 
ensuring safety across the life cycle of complex systems is an 
important challenge for the systems engineering community. 
HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) is among these 
systematic methods and techniques, which is used by oil and 
gas industry to identify hazards and operability problems. 
After several decades of its application from 1974, very little 
focus has been on the dimensions of system complexity dealt 
with in HAZOP studies in the different stages of life cycle of 
a plant project. Recent accidents in advanced industrial 
processes and technological infrastructures also have 
demonstrated that system complexity is a major challenge in 
the management of process safety. Understanding the nature 
of system complexity and how to deal with it and manage the 
associated risks are the focus aspects of system designers as 
well as operators, and also the focus of science-based safety 
engineering research. 
Plant design documents, operating procedures, online data are 
in different forms used to represent the system complexity. 
As always, these are necessary sources to carry out HAZOP. 
Proper integration of these sources of information requires a 
fundamental knowledge of system complexity and 
knowledge of how to cope with it by means of system 
models. 
As indicated by the literature review presented by Dunjó et 
al. (2010), approximately 40 % of HAZOP-related research is 
focused on HAZOP automation. Some computer-aiding 
applied to HAZOP reviewed by Lees (1996).  In principle, it 
is commonly agreed that it is impossible to completely 
eliminate the presence of a human expert team in the HAZOP 
execution process, but there are several attempts to create a 
robust support tool that is able to automate some of the 
procedures necessary to perform a HAZOP study. Zhao et al. 
(2009) argued that the difficulties of fully automating 
HAZOP by computer lie in the fact that the highly flexible 
reasoning mechanism and knowledge structure of human 
experts cannot be effectively simulated by computer systems. 
In addition, it is problematic to assume we ever be possible to 
obtain complete knowledge. 
Besides the available documentation tools which provided 
workflow support for HAZOP analysis, such as PHAWorks, 
and PHAPro, there are two basic approaches in HAZOP 
automation experts system with reasoning capabilities: 
shallow knowledge based and model based. Shallow 
knowledge-based approach uses large knowledge databases 
containing information about the failure mode, causes and 
consequences of various process units and/or pieces of 
equipment. Typical knowledge-based experts systems are e.g. 
projects of OptHAZOP, TOPHAZOP and EXPERTOP by 
Khan and Abbasi (2000), ExpHAZOP by Rahman et al. 
(2009). Typical model-based experts systems are e.g. 
HAZOPExpert, a HAZOP automation tool developed by 
Venkatasubramanian and Vaidhyanathan (1996), PHAsuite 
and PetroHAZOP by Zhao et al. (2005), HAZID by McCoy 
et al (1999).  
This study gives an insight of how to deal with system 
complexity from a HAZOP study perspective. A functional 
based HAZOP method and computer aided tool are 
introduced for improving HAZOP quality and efficiency with 
low manpower cost and supporting brainstorm section in 
HAZOP studies. 
Section 2 gives necessary background about HAZOP 
technique and relevant topic of the paper. Section 3 analyses 
the knowledge management of system complexity in 
HAZOP. Section 4 presents the methodology used in this 
paper, namely functional model-based HAZOP method. 
Section 5 presents a simple case study to illustrate the 
proposed method. Some discussion and perspectives are in 
section6. Section 7 concludes the work and gives an outlook 
for future work. 
2. HAZOP TECHNIQUE 
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2.1  HAZOP Method 
In the 1960s, an improved form of what-if analysis emerged 
within Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), and its application 
first became known as operability and hazard studies. Later, 
to emphasize the importance of process safety, the name 
HAZOP was coined. HAZOP study is a well-accepted 
method for hazard identification of process designs and for 
planned modifications, which initially was developed for 
analysing chemical process hazards (Kletz, 2001). The 
training of HAZOP is also continuously done in education 
and industry and lessons were learnt. It greatly accelerated 
after the methyl isocyanate (MIC) release in Bhopal, India, in 
1984. A large release of hydrogen fluoride from a Texas City, 
Texas, refinery in 1987 prompted the oil and gas industry to 
embrace HAZOP studies.  
The approach is a structured brainstorming using guidewords 
and is performed by a multidisciplinary team during a set of 
meetings to derive the records of causes and consequences of 
deviations. An effective HAZOP ensures that all potential 
deviations from design intentions are identified and process 
hazards are revealed. Based on the brainstorming sessions, 
mitigating actions can be planned against unacceptable 
process consequences or actions for improvement of the 
system safety integrity level. It is important that records of 
the brainstorming sessions and documentation of planned 
actions are available for review by management and 
authorities.  
2.2 Challenges Facing HAZOP 
HAZOP mainly faces 5 challenges: (1) Knowledge 
management of system complexity; (2) Uncertainty; (3) 
Vagueness; (4) levels of completeness; (5) Efficiency. The 
challenges pyramid is shown in Fig. 1. The following 
sections address the first challenge in detail.  
 
Fig. 1. Pyramid of HAZOP challenges  
3. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEM 
COMPLEXITY IN HAZOP 
HAZOP is a tool or process to identify potential hazard and 
operability problems. It is used to provide management with 
knowledge of where potential hazards may exist and to 
provide information on mitigation recommendations for plant 
design modifications prior to construction, on mitigation 
recommendations for providing specific details for 
administrative controls, on hazard information 
communication. Understanding of the system complexity is 
the means to carry HAZOP. In addition, HAZOP itself is a 
structured method to cope with complexity.  
Complexity in system engineering can be expressed by the 
multiple levels of subsystems, their connections and the 
number of system elements and their interrelations (Lind, 
2014). In terms of functions, the function of entire complex 
systems is the aggregation and convergence of the functions 
of the sub-parts.  
Before we look into the complexity of an engineered system, 
the distinction between three types (structure, function and 
behaviour) of description of a physical system is explained.  
The essence of a functional description is teleology or 
intention, the relation of the structure and behaviour of a 
mechanism to its larger context. For example, pumps have 
two generic functions: one function of a pump is to transport 
fluids under specific conditions and another function of a 
pump contains all fluids under all pertinent design conditions. 
Semantic analysis reveals that the verb transport represents a 
relation between an element of structure (the pump) and a 
possible behaviour (fluids are not vaporized). However, 
simulation of the working equipment does not include 
vaporization among its possible behaviours. The possibility 
of vaporization is command in the design process for the 
equipment, prior to the addition of the pump. The operating 
pressure of the pump ensures the fluids are able to be in 
liquid phase under design conditions.  
Different dimensions of complexity of a system are 
elaborated below. 
3.1  Complexity of Intentions 
At the highest level of a design process, the designer bears 
the design intent in mind. Through the design process, the 
designer transforms the design intentions into realizable 
design details.  HAZOP plays a role in verifying if the design 
solution is safe and safe enough considering foreseeable and 
unforeseeable events.  .  
In HAZOP, the step of dividing the process into “nodes” is a 
way to address the complexity of design intentions. Because 
the “nodes” are the process sections which share design 
intentions.  However, how to divide the “nodes” is not 
explicitly explained in the traditional HAZOP method 
procedure.  Dunjó et al. (2011) proposed a criterion for 
selecting and sizing nodes. But the complexity of intentions 
was not addressed in his paper. The complexity of design 
intentions is rooted in the hierarchical levels of design 
objectives.  The complexity of intentions can be expressed by 
a goal tree (GT). The GT is concerned with the goals and 
objectives which must be achieved by the system. Both safety 
and process objectives are represented in the GT. The 
customary usage is to start the GT with a single top objective 
which is achieved if all safety and process objectives are met. 
All objectives are then described in terms of sub-objectives 
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2.1  HAZOP Method 
In the 1960s, an improved form of what-if analysis emerged 
within Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), and its application 
first became known as operability and hazard studies. Later, 
to emphasize the importance of process safety, the name 
HAZOP was coined. HAZOP study is a well-accepted 
method for hazard identification of process designs and for 
planned modifications, which initially was developed for 
analysing chemical process hazards (Kletz, 2001). The 
training of HAZOP is also continuously done in education 
and industry and lessons were learnt. It greatly accelerated 
after the methyl isocyanate (MIC) release in Bhopal, India, in 
1984. A large release of hydrogen fluoride from a Texas City, 
Texas, refinery in 1987 prompted the oil and gas industry to 
embrace HAZOP studies.  
The approach is a structured brainstorming using guidewords 
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deviations from design intentions are identified and process 
hazards are revealed. Based on the brainstorming sessions, 
mitigating actions can be planned against unacceptable 
process consequences or actions for improvement of the 
system safety integrity level. It is important that records of 
the brainstorming sessions and documentation of planned 
actions are available for review by management and 
authorities.  
2.2 Challenges Facing HAZOP 
HAZOP mainly faces 5 challenges: (1) Knowledge 
management of system complexity; (2) Uncertainty; (3) 
Vagueness; (4) levels of completeness; (5) Efficiency. The 
challenges pyramid is shown in Fig. 1. The following 
sections address the first challenge in detail.  
 
Fig. 1. Pyramid of HAZOP challenges  
3. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT OF SYSTEM 
COMPLEXITY IN HAZOP 
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pump contains all fluids under all pertinent design conditions. 
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unforeseeable events.  .  
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the “nodes” are the process sections which share design 
intentions.  However, how to divide the “nodes” is not 
explicitly explained in the traditional HAZOP method 
procedure.  Dunjó et al. (2011) proposed a criterion for 
selecting and sizing nodes. But the complexity of intentions 
was not addressed in his paper. The complexity of design 
intentions is rooted in the hierarchical levels of design 
objectives.  The complexity of intentions can be expressed by 
a goal tree (GT). The GT is concerned with the goals and 
objectives which must be achieved by the system. Both safety 
and process objectives are represented in the GT. The 
customary usage is to start the GT with a single top objective 
which is achieved if all safety and process objectives are met. 
All objectives are then described in terms of sub-objectives 
IFAC OOGP 2018
Esbjerg, Denmark. May 30 - June 1, 2018
212
 
 
     
 
which may also be further refined, continuing to any level of 
detail required. In general, at the upper levels which comprise 
the GT, this decomposition is found to form a conjunctive 
hierarchy, in that, at these levels of abstract description, 
objectives decompose into sub-objectives all of which must 
be achieved. 
3.2  Functional Complexity 
In engineering, a function is interpreted as a specific process, 
action or task that a system is designed to perform (Khazaei, 
1993). System functions are facts such as that all knowledge 
shared by engineers is agreed upon in the community (Searle, 
1995). These for two interwoven principles, namely as 
machine-like functions and ‘regulation’ functions, then 
machine-like functions are ideally defined by precise 
operational principles, while the correctness of a regulative 
achievement can be expressed only in gestalt-like terms. In 
process engineering domain, these two principles refer to the 
process functions and control functions.  Therefore, the 
functional complexity is inter-subjective (Wu et al., 2014).  
Suh’s measure of complexity (Suh, 2012) in the functional 
domain is built on the concept and framework of axiomatic 
approach of design. In his complexity theory, complexity is 
defined as a measure of uncertainty in satisfying the 
functional requirements (FRs) within the specified accuracy. 
In designing engineered systems, by means of design 
parameters (DPs) or physical parameters to satisfy the FRs.  
When a given DP is chosen to satisfy the FR, the uncertainty 
is characterized by the system’s ability to satisfy the FR 
within its design range. The FR is satisfied only when the 
system range is within the design range. HAZOP is used to 
identify the scenarios when system range is overlapped or 
completely out of design range. However, the traditional 
HAZOP method is not able to verify the functional 
requirements in a satisfactory way. Because it does not start 
from the intended system functions analysis.  
3.3 Structural Complexity 
Structural complexity deals with multiple connections 
between component and subsystem of a technical system. 
Structural Complexity Management is often seen as having 
evolved out of the first complex engineering projects that 
were accompanied by the paradigm of Systems Engineering, 
having it evolved out of Systems Theory. There is a 
substantial body of metrics available that is able to assess the 
structural complexity of a system with a view to different 
patterns. However, the transfer to the specifics of engineering 
design processes, i.e., what behavioural aspects relate to what 
structural characteristic evaluated in a metric, remains 
unsolved. The relation between structural complexity and 
behaviour is a challenge for traditional HAZOP studies 
because it can be difficult to associate parameter deviations 
with structure patterns.  
3.4  Means-end Relation Links Functions and Structures 
In the context of system objectives, the structural complexity 
can be expressed by five types of inter-relations between 
structural entities (e.g. components, energy and material 
medium) and system functions in means-ends relations, see 
in Fig.2: (1)Side effect: Although the structural means are 
dedicated to achieving a particular function, some of them 
may exert secondary effects on other functions.(2) 
conditional constraints: in many cases, the use of a structural 
entity in order to ensure a function may be conditioned on the 
fulfilment of another structural entity.(3) Technical 
dependencies: They are generally due to the sharing of 
technical resources between several structural entities. (4) 
Sharing dependencies: To achieve a specific function 
(capacity), it is required to share structural entities or 
interactions of structural entities. (5) Arbitration: In some 
cases, alternative structural entities are required to achieve a 
specific function. To carry out HAZOP studies, such inter-
relations between structural entities are required as domain 
knowledge.     
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Fig. 2.A generic presentation of structural complexity in the 
context of system objectives 
3.5 Operational Complexity 
Operability is the ability to keep equipment, a system or a 
whole industrial installation in a safe and reliable functioning 
condition, according to pre-defined operational requirements. 
Accordingly, operability problems are associated with any 
operation which under the requirements would cause a 
shutdown or possibly lead to a violation of HSE (Health, 
Safety, and Environment) regulations or negatively impact 
profitability.  
Operational complexity includes the consideration of the 
operational modes of a system, for example, start-up mode is 
required to get the system into the nominal operation 
situation, emergency modes guarantee secure operation when 
shutting down, or different configurations to comply with 
varying demands (Kirchhübel, 2016). Process HAZOP needs 
to pay more attention to the transmission between operational 
modes of a system. 
3.6 Summary 
HAZOP is required to relate a system representation to the 
underlying chain of causality of triggering hazards.  
Therefore, there is a need to provide a modelling method 
which can reveal above system complexity aspects relevant 
for system design and operation. Also such modeling 
language should be with clear syntax and semantics to 
decompose and aggregate the above mentioned different 
aspects of complexity in a meaningful way, such as for 
example by using means-ends and whole-part decomposition. 
Furthermore, it should have a feature for supporting cause-
consequence reasoning.  
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4.  METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Functional model-based HAZOP method 
Deviation scenarios can be categorized into typical and 
atypical scenarios. Typical scenarios are those happen 
frequently and known deviation from normal expectations of 
undesired events based on prior knowledge. Normally, they 
can be identified and analyzed by HAZOP. Atypical 
scenarios (Paltrinieri et al. 2012) are those unknown 
scenarios due to lack of knowledge, which are usually missed 
or outside the scope of HAZOP. Those atypical scenarios can 
be learnt through the accident lessons. 
Functional model-based HAZOP method presented in the 
paper can support process knowledge representation as well 
as the brainstorm section of HAZOP dealing with both types 
of scenarios. The reason is that the causality of events comes 
from functional means-end analysis. It will be explained in 
detail in following sections. 
4.2 Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) technique 
MFM is a network structured hypergraph, where the 
connection between function nodes (flow functions and 
control functions) is constrained by syntax rules. Connections 
represent casual relation (influencer and participate) as shown 
in Fig. 3. The set of function primitives are defined on the 
basis of a theory of action types applied for process systems. 
States of the function nodes are defined by possible failure 
modes of the specific function. MFM provides facilities for 
semantic distinctions between different functional 
abstractions of a system and gives guidelines of how to 
decompose and aggregate system functions, and how to relate 
them to objectives using means-end relations (Lind, 2017). 
Terminologies of MFM can be found in tutorial (Zhang & 
Lind 2017a). The MFM models presented in the following 
are built using a web-based model builder called EGolF 
developed by ELDOR Technology, Norway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. MFM symbols 
4.3 MFM reasoning 
Reasoning with MFM models is based on the cause effect 
relations associated with the function–function and function–
objective relations (Zhang et al. 2015). These casual-effect 
relations are general, i.e. independent from the concrete 
systems to be modelled. MFM model reasoning is based on a 
fixed set of cause-effect inference rules defined by MFM 
model patterns. Those cause-effect inference rules are still 
under exploration for expanding to accommodate for more 
specific engineering domains and cases. The recent 
developed rules for reasoning about control and barrier 
functions are implemented and applied in the case study 
described below. For readers who are interested in the 
reasoning rules pattern of control functions and barrier 
functions in detail, please refer to the relevant work published 
in (Zhang & Lind 2017b; Wu et al. 2017). 
The MFM reasoning engine developed at Technical 
University of Denmark (DTU) implements the inference rules 
in a rule-based reasoning shell. The reasoning system 
propagates state information of each function and can derive 
possible cause and consequence paths of a given deviation in 
a functional state. The functionality of EGolF is under 
development for implementing the inference rules. Currently, 
it can be used for reading the reasoning case file from the 
reasoning engine developed in DTU and display the evidence 
and cause-consequence paths. For HAZOP studies, the 
reasoning rules can be used. What is more, the same 
reasoning rules can be used for offline/real-time diagnosis 
analysis in the light of observations or other evidence is used 
by the reasoning system to select cause-consequence paths 
consistent with the given evidence.   
5.  CASE STUDY 
The scope of the HAZOP was the Water Treatment Pilot 
Plant at AAU Esbjerg. A specific operational case was 
defined including the following main process equipment: 
waste water tank (MT02), waste water pump (WP01), 
compressed air addition, vertical pipeline rise, 1-stage 
separator and one hydro cyclone (HY05).  The stream 
diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. The stream diagram of the Water Treatment Pilot 
Plant at AAU Esbjerg  
A traditional HAZOP study was completed by 13 HAZOP 
team members in a 2 days’ workshop. All in all, 60 
deviations from design intent were identified and 27 
recommended actions were put forward.   
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Fig. 5. Traditional HAZOP results of separator pressure low 
In order to compare the results from traditional HAZOP and 
functional-based HAZOP, the deviation of the separator 
pressure low is taken as an example. The result from the 
traditional HAZOP study is shown in Fig. 5. By contrast, an 
MFM model was built for the same scope of the system 
following a modelling strategy (Lind, 2017).  The MFM 
model is shown in Fig. 6.  Separator pressure low means the 
state of the storage function PT14_pres_sto is low. The cause 
reasoning results for the separator pressure low are five 
causal paths: PSV_pres_bar breach-ds, 
CV03_CVX04_pres_tra low, CV07_pres_tra high, 
Level_Sep_sto low and CV12_pres_bar breach-ds. If we take 
CV12_pres_bar breach-ds as possible causes, then the other 
possible causes are isolated by setting those functions’ states 
as normal, then the consequences are shown in Fig.8. Tnere 
are four possible consequences: CV07_pres_tra low, 
Sep01_PCtrl_obj false, AFM02_M_Mfs_tra decrease, 
CV03_CVX04_pres_tra high and AirTo Mt02_pres_sin high. 
Following such procedure, all possible consequences for each 
possible cause can be identified.  
 
Fig. 6. An MFM model of the Water Treatment Pilot Plant at 
AAU Esbjerg 
 
Fig. 7. Causual paths for the separator pressure low 
 
Fig. 8. Consequence paths for the CV12 breach downstream 
The result clearly indicates that one more possible cause is 
the upstream inlet pressure is low and consequences along the 
timestamp change can be identified by the functional-based 
HAZOP method.   
6.  DISCUSSION and PERSPECTIVE 
From the case study results, some significant features of the 
proposed method are discussed below: 
First, functional modelling may reduce the modelling 
complexity and thereby reduces the complexity of HAZOP 
studies. Modeling of a plant from functional perspectives 
may be abstract; however, it is coherent with the functional 
requirement of process system design. The functional 
requirements for a process system are less than the possible 
physical objects combinations such as plant structure model 
of ISO 15926. In this way, the modeling complexity 
decreases. Multilevel Flow Modeling is a best suitable 
technique for functional modeling. Traditionally, HAZOP 
only considers one node at a time, and the node boundary 
selected maybe based on the structural decomposition, which 
could result in poor boundary selection. The different isolated 
nodes may contribute to the same function requirements. By 
contrast, if the process is modelled by functional stream, the 
isolated nodes can be aggregated into one node await for the 
following HAZOP analysis since the functional nodes 
decomposition attempt to capture the functional 
requirements. Consequently, it reduces the complexity of 
HAZOP studies.    
Second, qualitative functional models facilitate better 
understanding the process system in a high level abstraction 
and require capability of representing knowledge associated 
with non-routine HAZOPs to improve completeness. 
Functional models represent safety functions together with 
plant process functions. Control function in MFM models can 
represent mode transmission by additional studies on means-
ends decomposition of the control system so that it can assist 
in HAZOPs for non-routine modes of operation, namely, 
non-routine HAZOPs. 
Third, casual reasoning in functional-based HAZOP is based 
on tacit knowledge. The communication among HAZOP 
team members is based on the sharing prototypical 
definitions of physical objects because they have similar 
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experience, so called tacit knowledge.  The causal reasoning 
is an analog formalizing process. The qualitative casual 
reasoning is useful to perform backward reasoning (cause) 
and forward reasoning (consequence) assisting the 
brainstorming session tailored to a specific domain. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
It concludes that HAZOP technique is a key in Process Safety 
Review methodology for risk management. It pointed out the 
HAZOP challenges and the computer aided methods for 
HAZOP involve with application of functional models to deal 
with those challenges in the aspect of knowledge 
management of system complexity. Multilevel Flow 
modeling (MFM) should be selected to do modelling of 
process systems and reasoning to generate hazard scenarios. 
The completeness of such HAZOP results can be verified by 
industrial HAZOP studies. Although best HAZOP practice is 
always the target to achieve in oil and gas industry, the 
performance satisfactory varies from companies. Therefore, 
companies should be encouraged to have an open mind to 
embrace such advanced safety technologies by all means. 
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